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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WiLcox.
MOTION FOR A NEW TRALz. 0. and T. Phila. Co., Jan. Sess., 1914, Nos. 554 and
555.
Commonwealth v. Sheppell, LXXVII, L. I. 636, 23 Dist. Rep. (Pa.), 904.
Before Bregy, P. J., Ralston and Barratt, J. J. Practice, Q. S.-Examination of
subject only to such observation and surveillance as might, under the circum-
stances, be necessary to assure his safe custody, is res adjudicata, both at the
trial and on motion for new trial.
MURDER.
Points-Duty to instruct as to manslaughter. The prisoner's wife was found
in his room dead from four pistol wounds; the prisoner was found near by,
wounded by a pistol shot in the forehead. On trial for her murder, the prisoner
refused to testify and the only direct evidence of the crime was the testimony
of his son, called by the Commonwealth, that, on the witness' entering the room
prisoner by his own physiciai--Ruling of the court in banc-Res adjudicato at
trial. The refusal of the court in banc to permit a defendant under indictment
for murder to submit himself to examination by two physicians, in the presence
of his counsel, in advance of the trial, for the purpose of preparing his case,
immediately after the shots, the prisoner had said to him that his wife had shothim and that he should go for a "cop." The defendant asked the trial judge to
charge that if the jury believed that the killing occurred under such circum-
stances, the crime might not rise higher than that of manslaughter. The trialjudge refused the point without reading it and stated the evidence without
comment: Held, to be error. Ralston, J., dissents.
MURm.
Points-Duty to charge that no inference can be draun; against prisonerfrom failure to testify. On a trial for murder, it is the duty of the trial judge,
if requested so to do, to instruct the jury that no inference can be drawn against
the prisoner by reason of the fact that he did not testify in his own behalf,
notwithstanding the fact that no reference to the prisoner's failure to testify
has been made by either the district attorney or the trial judge. The refusal of
such a point is error, although the point was not read to the jury. Ralston, J.,
dissents. JoHN LISLE.
AN ITALIAN DEcISION IN A CASE OF LmEL.
(From La Ginstizia Penale, July 29, 1914, p. 1232.) Readers will have seen
the letter written by the German dramatist, Hauptmann, to Jean Rolland, in
answer to one written by Rolland to Hauptmann. Americans have been puzzled
to read in Hauptmann's letter that he had the right to a reply twice as long
as Rolland's letter. The sky is cleared by a decision of an Italian court, which
holds that the Press Act does not give an editor the right to mutilate the reply
of a reader who has been mentioned or indicated in an- attack appearing in his
paper, nor to suppress any part of it, nor to modify in any way its contents or
its form, but must insert the whole of it, in as conspicuous a place as the attack
occupied, and just as the author has written it, because the author alone is thejudge of what his answer is to be, of the means of his defense, and of the
opportuneness of it; provided, however, that he keeps within the limits of the
law, and does not speak "injuriously" of the editor, or of a third party. A, the
person attacked, who replied to the editor, and sued the latter for not pub-
lishing the reply, was held not to have been aggrieved, because he went beyond
the limits of the law, and said, in the course of his defense: "I have never
been anarchistically inclined, and whoever asserts the contrary lies shamelessly.
I have scrupulously adhered to the resolution, unmindful of the praises of ad-
versaries and despising the insinuations and the calumnies of certain persons;"
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since, although the editor was not mentioned, the author unquestionably referred
to him, and since, when one refers to another as a shameless liar and as the
disseminator of insinuations and calumnies, he offends his honor, his reputation
and his decorum. ROBERT FERRARI.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Effect of suspension clause in treaties upon domestic legislation. To stu-
dents of international law there is an important decision by the Court of Cassa-
tion in Rome, First Section, reported in La Giustizia Penale (II, 84 fol.), (July
22, 1914). At the Convention- of Berne it was agreed by the contracting parties,
which included fourteen European nations, that women and children should work
n;o later than 10 p. m. and no earlier than 5 a. m., and no longer than eight and
one-half hours. The agreement was to go into effect "when this convention is
ratified by all the governments of the contracting parties." Italy passed a law
giving "the government of the king authority to execute fully and entirely the
convention signed at Berne the 26th of September, 1906, between Italy (etc., in-
cluding thirteen other states) for the prevention of night work to women em-
ployed in industry." Penal sanctions were attacked. Two governments did not
ratify the convention. An employer allowed a woman to work past 10 p. m.
Had he violated the criminal law in so doing? The court held that "to execute
the convention" meant to "ratify the convention ;" that is, Parliament had not
put the convention into effect in Italy, but had only given the government author-
ity to ratify the contract of its representatives; because, for making the con-
vention effective, the consent of all the contracting governments was necessary,
the clause, "when this (convention) is ratified by all the governments of the
contracting parties," meaning that no nation could execute the terms of the
Berne Convention unless all the other nations did likewise; and the employer
was therefore not bound by the law. Giuseppe Meloni, one of the editors of La
Giustizia Penale, contributes a learned and interesting note to the case, in which
he disagrees with the decision upon the grounds that there is no precedent for it,
that the precedents are all against it, and that in reason it is wrong. The clause
in dispute "establishes the minimum of ratifications which are necessary, without
other act on the part of any government, to fix the beginning of the coming into
effect of the convention within a certain time." The note is about 3,000 words
long, and is a complete, compact, short treatise on "The Perfection of Inter-
national Treaties While the Sending of the Ratification of the Contracting States
Is Awaited; and the Value of a Domestic Law Which Authorizes the Execution
of Them." He treats the question under the following heads: 1. The position
of the Question. (a) From the side of the decisions; (b) From the theoretical
side. 2. International treaties of administrative law. 3. The value of the signa-
state, severely criticized him in public speech and then sought to reprobate him
tures of the representatives of the various states in preliminary negotiations;
the idea and efficacy of a suspensive condition in a contract; when a contract
is said to be perfected. 4. Rules of state law (declaration of the will of the
state) directed to the execution of the terms of treaties; conclusions. The rea-
soning of the note seems to be sound. ROBERT FERRARI.
LIABILITY OF A FINDER TO THE PENAL LAW.
(From La Giustizia Penale, Aug. 20, 1914, p. 1337.) An article found in a
corner of the stoop of an inn is considered lost, since it cannot said to be in the
"sphere of proprietary activity" of the owner; this sphere of activity extending
to the limits of the room or apartment assigned to a person, but not to the
whole inn with all its appurtenances, common to all the travelers. A found a
bracelet on the stoop of B, an inn. A was arrested for larceny and convicted.
Conviction was quashed in the Court of Appeals. The essential element in the
crime of larceny is the taking of possession by one's self of that of which another
has not only property but also possession, possession being defined as having
under custody, immediate or mediate. When, therefore, a thing goes out of the
custody of a person, or is no more under the sphere of supervision of the owner,
the latter, although retaining over that thing his right as owner, has lost the
possession of it, and a person who finds it and appropriates it is not guilty of
larceny, because the contrectatio is lacking, although he may be guilty of unlaw-
ful appropriation of a lost article.
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There is room for a Journal of Comparative Law, which will give digests
and discussions of the decisions of the courts of last resort of European coun-
tries. Nothing can more clearly bring into relief the qualities and the defects
of our own law. La Giustizia Penale is one of the very best annotated re-
porters. ROBERT FERRuw.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Davis v. Berry et al., 216 Fed. 413. Sterilization of criminals. Acts 35th
Gen. Assemb. Iowa, c. 187, providing for the performance of the operation of
vasectomy on criminals twice convicted of a felony, is unconstitutional as pro-
viding a cruel and unusual punishment. And since the operation is to be per-
formed on an order of the State Board of Parole after a private hearing before
the board, not open to the public, and of which the prisoner is not advised until
ordered to submit to the operation, it is also unconstitutional as a deprivation
of due process of law, which means that every person must have his day in
court, must be confronted by his accuser, and given a public hearing according
to law in the regular course of its administration through courts of justice.
It is also'unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, in that it provides for the inflic-
tion of a punishment for past offenses by legislative act without a jury trial.
Commonwealth v. Farmer, Mass., 106 N. E. 150. Short forms of indictment.
Rev. Laws, c. 218, setting forth short forms of indictments, does not violate
Bill of Rights, art. 12, providing that no subject shall be held to answer for any
crime or offense until it is fully, plainly, substantially and formally described
to him; nor does it violate Const. U. S., Amend. 14, or any other provision of
that constitution, especially in view of sec. 39, authorizing the court to require
the prosecution to furnish a bill of particulars.
Jonson v. United States, 215 Fed. 679. White Slave Act. "Commerce.' Since
the term "commerce," as used in the federal constitution, granting to Congress
the right to legislate with reference to interstate and foreign commerce, is not
limited to traffic in or an exchange of commodities, but extends as well to the
transportation of persons, and includes navigation and intercourse, giving to
Congress not only the right to regulate, but actually to prohibit transportation
in the interest of the public welfare, Congress had complete power to pass the
White Slave Act, making it a felony to transport or cause to be transported
any woman or girl for prostitution, or any other immoral purpose, though the
statute be construed as extending beyond commercialized vice to include trans-
portation in interstate commerce of a female for the purpose of mere unlawful
sexual intercourse with defendant.
DETECTIVE.
Brantley v. State, Miss., 65 S. 512. Crime committed to secure evidence.
The defendant was convicted of the statutory crime of acting as the agent of
the purchaser in the unlawful purchase of intoxicating liquor. On the trial he
offered evidence to show that he had been asked by a deputy sheriff to aid in
ferreting out *"blind tigers" and particularly in getting evidence against the
person from whom he bought this liquor; that after he received the money
from the purchaser and before he botght the liquor he reported the case to the
deputy sheriff, who asked him to make the purchase, so that evidence might be
obtained against the seller, and promised that no harm would result to him from
so doing. The trial court excluded this evidence. Held that the evidence was
properly excluded as in order to provide the seller with an opportunity to violate
the law the defendant committed a crime distinct from and not included in the
one the seller was induced to commit. The case was distinguished from those
in which the detective co6perates with criminals so that he would be guilty of
the crime committed by them if his intention had been the same as theirs. The
conviction was affirmed.
DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
People v. Sinclair, 149 N. Y. Supp. 54. Elements of the Offense. Laws 1882,
c. 1458, provides that every person in the city and county of New York shall
be guilty of disorderly conduct tending to a breach of the peace, who in any
thoroughfare or public place shall commit any of the following offenses: "(3)
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Every person who shall use any threatening, abusive or insulting behavior with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may
be occasioned." Where defendant, occuping no relation to Rockefeller, whom
defendant believed to be responsible for certain public occurrences in another
by parading in processional form in the street with companions, all wearing
crepe, opposite a building where R. had an office, with knowledge that there
would probably be persons there who would resent such conduct and might cause
a breach of the peace, defendant and his companions, though intending them-
selves to act peaceably, were guilty of threatening, abusive and insulting behavior
whereby a breach of the peace might be occasioned in violation of the above
statute declaring that such conduct shall constitute disorderly conduct.
DiSTURBING RELIGIOUS SERVICES.
Ellis v. State, Ala. App., 65 So. 412. Between Services. Intent. While the
congregation, who had attended the regular morning services at a church, were
eating a basket dinner on the church grounds, during the intermission before
the afternoon services began, the defendant used language which created a dis-
turbance. Held that the congregation assembled upon the church grounds for
religious worship was protected by the statute though the disturbance took place
at a time when the religious services were not in progress. In the language
intentionally used by the defendant was such as to disturb the assembly, and
did disturb them, it was not necessary to a conviction that it should have been
uttered for the purpose of disturbing them. The conviction was affirmed.
EscAPE AFTER CoNvicTioN.
State v. Pishner, W. Va., 81 S. E. 1046. Conviction reversed. The defend-
ant was convicted of a felony and confined in jail pending a writ of error from
that judgment. On Feb. 27 he broke jail and was recaptured the next day. On
March 7 he was indicted for escaping. On June 17 the supreme court reversed
the conviction in the formev case and discharged him on the ground that there
was no evidence to warrant the conviction. He was then tried on the second
indictment and convicted. The statute under which he was this time convicted
provides that "a person confined in jail on conviction of a criminal offense, who
escapes by force or violence," shall receive a specified punishment. The majority
of the court thought the statute applied only to persons who had been convicted
by a final judgment of the court. The conviction in the trial court was not
final, as a writ of error had issued and it was necessary to await the decision
on the writ before it could be known whether the conviction was final. As the
mandate of the supreme court reversed the judgment below and discharged the
prisoner, it was conclusive proof that he was not guilty. Hence he did not
escape while confined "on conviction of a criminal offense' Two judges dis-
sented. The case is distinguishable from State v. Lewis, 19 Kan. 261, immor-
talized by Eugene T. Ware in the poem printed on page 266 of the official report.
The Kansas statute applied to escape before conviction.
FoRMER JEOPARDY.
State v. Rose, 106 N. E. 50, Ohio. Identity of offense. Where a person
has been in jeopardy upon an information or affidavit charging that he contrib-
uted to the moral delinquency of a female person in violation of sec. 1654, Gen-
eral Code, such jeopardy cannot be successfully pleaded as a bar to a prosecution
by indictment on a charge of rape under sec. 12413, General Code. The pro-
vision of the constitution relating to jeopardy is in the following words: "No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The offense charged
in the information is not the same offense and does not include the offense
charged in the indictment, and hence the defense of double jeopardy must fail.
The words, "same offense," mean same offense, not the same transaction, not
the same acts, not the same circumstances or same situation.
People v. Mendelson, Ill., 106 N. E. 249. Identity of offenses. A trial and
acquittal on a charge of burglary and larceny by breaking and entering the prem-
ises of certain parties at a certain street number was not sufficient as a plea of
former jeopardy in the trial for the burglary and larceny of the goods of certain
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other parties at the same street number, since the offenses were not identical
within the rule that, if the facts charged in the subsequent indictment would, if
found to be true, have warranted a conviction upon the first one, the former
judgment is a bar to the subsequent prosecution, otherwise not.
INTOXIcATING LIQUORS.
Skermetta v. State, Miss., 65 So. 502. Serving wine wdth weals. The de-
fendant had three boarders at seventy-five cents per day. He served wine at
dinner. No extra charge was made for the wine. All of the parties were natives
of Austria, where wine forms a part of every dinner as a universal custom.
Held that this constituted a sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of the pro-
hibition law of the state.
LARCENY.
In re La Page, 216 Fed. 256. Possession of stolen property as evidence of
larceny. While the possession of recently stolen property is some evidence that
the possessor is the thief, such possession must be a conscious possession, and,
where the evidence makes it at least just as probable that the stolen property
was placed on the premises of the suspected party by someone else, the presence
of the property on his premises has no probative force.
MORTGAGED CROPS.
Courtney ,. State, Ala. App., 65 So. 433. Sale to defraud mortgagee. The
defendant and his brother owned a tract of land. They agreed with one Hattaway
to furnish the land and a team to cultivate it if Hattaway would furnish the
labor, and that he should have half the crop raised, they the other half. Under
the law of Alabama this arrangement fixed the legal title to the crop in the
owners of the land, subject to a lien in favor of Hattaway, which had priority
to all other liens on the crop, for the value of his half. After the making of the
agreement with Hattaway the defendant and his brother mortgaged the crop to
a bank. After this mortgage had been made and recorded, the defendant joined
Hattaway in a mortgage of Hattaway's interest in the crop to one Tisdale. When
the crop was harvested the defendant, either alone or in conjunction with his
brother, sold it and paid the entire proceeds to the bank, to be applied on the
debt to it. Held that the defendant was properly convicted of selling the crop
with intent to hinder, delay or defraud the mortgagee. By the mortgage Tisdale
became entitled to the benefit of Hattaway's first lien on the crop. While the
bank under its mortgage was entitled to possession of the crop, subject to Hatta-
way's lien, it was not entitled to the entire proceeds from its sale. As the sale
and payment of the entire proceeds to the bank would naturally tend to hinder,
delay or defraud Tisdale, the jury were justified in drawing the inference that
the defendant intended this result.
NoLo CONTENDERE.
Chester v. State, Miss., 65 So. 510. Not an admission of guilt. On the trial
of the defendant for unlawfully keeping for sale intoxicating liquors, the state
was permitted to prove that the defendant had been arraigned in the city court
on the charge of keeping liquor for sale in violation of the city ordinance, the
charge being based on the same facts testified to in the trial in the state court,
and that her attorney bad pleaded nolo contendere. It did not appear that she
was present in the city court when that plea was entered. She had paid the
fine imposed by that court. Held that the evidence should not have been admitted.
While the plea had the same effect in the case pending in the city court as would
a plea of guilty, it did not have any effect beyond that particular case, and could
not be treated in a different proceeding as an admission of guilt.
PARDON.
People ea rel. Robin v. Hayes, Warden, 149 N. Y. Supp. 250. Authority of a
goveritwr to pardon after being impeached. Under the const., art. 4, see. 5, pro-
viding that the governor shall have power to grant pardons, and sec. 6, providing
that in case of impeachment of the governor, the powers and duties of the office
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shall devolve upon the lieutenant-governor for the residue of the term, or until
the disability shall cease, while the impeachment of a governor by the assembly
did not deprive him of the office, the powers and duties of the office devolved-
upon the lieutenant-governor pending the trial of the charges, and an attempt
thereafter by the governor to exercise the pardoning power was not valid as an
act of a de facto governor, since a "de facto governor" is an actual governor in
fact and reality, as distinguished from a governor de jure or by right, while to
"devolve" means to transfer from one person to another, to deliver over, to hand
down.
PROSTITUTION.
Johnson v. United States, 215 Fed. 679. Meaning of "other immoral pur-
pose" in White Slave Act. The White Slave Act makes it a felony for anyone
knowingly to transport, or cause to be transported or aid or assist in obtaining
transportation for, or in transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or any other im-
moral purpose. Held that while the term "prostitution" involves the financial
element and signifies commercialized vice, the words "other immoral purpose"
as used in the statute are not limited to kindred offeness involving the sharing
of profits by hire of the woman's body, and hence their meaning was fulfilled
by sexual debauchery between the female and the defendant involving no finan-
cial element.
TRIAL.
People v. Spencer, 106 N. E. 219, Ill. Taking picture of defendant. The
taking of defendant's picture in the presence of the jury, during the recess of
the court, showing him on the witness stand pointing his finger at the jury, was
not prejudicial.
VARIANCE.
Spanish v. State, Fla., 65 So. 459. Specific property stolen. An information
charging robbery alleged that the defendant stole a ten dollar bill, a five dollar
bill, a one dollar bill and a silver dollar, all of the value of seventeen dollars.
The state proved that the defendant took seventeen dollars, but did not show
how this amount was made up. Held that there was a fatal variance between
the charge and the proof, as the state had not proved that any of the money
specifically described had been stolen. It was said that seventeen dollars in
minor coins might have been stolen, and, if so, the defendant, on a new informa-
tion charging theft of such minor coins, would have difficulty in establishing the
fact that he had been previously convicted of that offense on the present informa-
tion. The conviction was reversed.
